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Abstract 
The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s voluntary actions 
and their outcomes. Intentional binding (the compressed time interval between voluntary 
actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit 
reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic 
responding, where strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced 
intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an 
objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that reduced binding results from 
the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when 
beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends 
upon awareness of intentions, showing that changes in metacognition of intentions affect 
perception.  
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The sense of agency is the experience we have of initiating and controlling our 
voluntary actions and their outcomes (see Haggard & Eitam, 2015). Intentional binding refers 
to the subjective compression of the time between an intentional action and its outcome, 
consisting of a forward shift of the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action 
binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward the action that caused it (outcome 
binding). (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002). The effect is sensitive to intentional action but 
requires no explicit reflection upon agency and may reflect the additional contribution of 
intentions to causal binding (Buehner, 2012; 2015). Intentional binding has been shown to be 
affected in a number of disorders of agency, for example schizophrenia (e.g., Voss et al, 
2010) and alien limb (Wolpe et al 2014) and to be reduced in coerced action (Caspar, 
Christensen, Cleeremans & Haggard, 2016).   
The ‘classical suggestion effect’ of hypnosis is the experience of involuntariness of an 
action (Weitzenhoffer, 1980) and changes in the sense of agency are central to hypnotic 
responding (Polito, Woody & Barnier, 2013). Sense of agency may arise from the integration 
of internal, and external, predictive and retrospective cues (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; 
Synofzik, Vosgerau & Voss, 2013), and also general beliefs about agency. Indeed, 
retrospectively manipulating beliefs about agency can alter attributions of agency (Wegner, 
2002). Hypnotic involuntariness may therefore reflect a relatively strong weighting of beliefs 
about hypnosis, and a relatively weak weighting of the internal signals provided by motor 
intentions.   
However, highly hypnotisable participants might merely report that a hypnotically 
suggested movement feels involuntary– even though they may experience the action as 
similar to any other voluntary action.  If so, phenomena sensitive to conscious intentions, 
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such as intentional binding, should be normal following hypnosis. Alternatively, if movement 
under hypnosis represents a shift from relying on internal action signals to relying on 
experimenter-delivered beliefs about action, then implicit measures sensitive to the 
experience of intentional action might be altered in hypnosis for highly hypnotisable subjects. 
It has been shown that beliefs about whether or not one is the cause of an outcome influence 
intentional binding (Desantis et al, 2011). Here, we address for the first time whether binding 
is influenced by beliefs about whether or not an action was intended. 
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Method 
Participants 
Eighteen participants (4 males, mean age = 20.2, SD = 2.35) were selected for high 
score on the SWASH, a modified version of a standard test of hypnotisability, the Waterloo-
Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility, Form C (WSGC; Bowers, 1993). As 
requested by the reviewers, later a second group of 14 participants were selected for a 
medium score on the SWASH (4 males, mean age = 23.4, SD = 5.2). The SWASH (Sussex 
Waterloo susceptibility to hypnosis scale) is a modified, ten item version of the 
WSGC:C, with age regression and dream suggestions removed to avoid participants 
becoming absorbed in negative experiences (Cardeña & Terhune, 2009). In addition to the 
objective ratings of the WSGC:C, the SWASH also includes a subjective experience rating 
for each suggestion. For example, the following is the subjective rating for item 2, “Moving 
hands together”: 
You were next told to hold your hands out in front of you about a foot apart and then 
told to imagine a force pulling your hands together. On a scale from 0 to 5, how strongly did 
you feel a force between your hands, where 0 means you felt no force at all and 5 means you 
felt a force so strong it was as if your hands were real magnets?  
 
 Participants were selected on the basis of their combined hypnotisability score (the 
simple mean of the objective and subjective scores, each scaled out of a maximum of 10), 
with a minimum cut-off of 5 (which was the top 11% of 266 screened) for the highly 
hypnotisable group. The medium hypnotisable group scored below 5 and above 2 on the 
SWASH. (15% of SWASH scores lie below 2).  
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 To assess whether participants were able to maintain an experience of involuntariness 
for the duration of the task, verbal ratings of involuntariness on a scale between 0 (completely 
voluntary) and 5 (completely involuntary) were recorded after each block of trials. Seven 
participants from the highly hypnotisable group who reported full voluntariness (an 
involuntariness score of 0) after any block in the post-hypnotic involuntariness condition 
were excluded. Two of these participants did not complete all conditions, and therefore 
provided insufficient data for comparisons. As the aim was to determine an objective 
correlate (intentional binding) of reported feelings of involuntariness, only cases where there 
were feelings of involuntariness are relevant for the high hypnotisable group. Analyses of the 
results for all highly hypnotisable participants together (whether or not they were able to 
sustain the experience of involuntariness) are shown in Table S4 in the Supplemental 
Material available online. The combined hypnotisability scores of those unable to sustain the 
suggestion was lower 5.98 (SD = 1.11) than those who maintained involuntariness, 7.48 (SD 
= 1.24), t(16) = 2.61, p = .019, BH[0,3.74] = 3.16. The medium hypnotisable group had a mean 
combined hypnotisability score of 3.19 (SD = 0.88). None of the participants in the medium 
hypnotisable group were able to sustain an experience of involuntariness throughout the 
experiment. One participant from the highly hypnotisable group was excluded based on prior 
criteria as fully specified also in Lush, Parkinson & Dienes (2016) (the standard deviation of 
their baseline action judgements was more than 3 times the group interquartile range in the 
passive (614.9 ms) and post-hypnotic (470.2 ms) conditions). Therefore, data from ten highly 
hypnotisable participants (1 male, mean age = 20, SD = 1.9) are reported.  
Highly hypnotisable participants were recruited for the duration of two terms, until 
the participant pool was exhausted. Medium hypnotisable participants were recruited during 
the summer break, until there were no more responses. Bayesian analyses were used to assess 
sensitivity. Crucially, we used Bayesian analyses to indicate the strength of evidence for H1 
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versus H0; the measure of evidence is valid no matter what the stopping rule (Rouder, 2014; 
Schoenbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, in press). 
No power analysis was conducted. We included Bayes factors so that there would be 
an assessment of the sensitivity of the data to distinguish H0 and H1. Once the data are in, 
power has no relevance to how sensitive the data are, because power is a property of decision 
rule in the long run; conversely Bayes factors indicate the sensitivity of the very data 
collected to distinguish H1 and H0. 
Ethical approval was received from the University of Sussex ethics committee and 
informed consent was obtained. Participants received cash payment of £18 or course credits. 
Materials and methods 
Visual stimuli were displayed at 100 Hz on a 21" CRT monitor and auditory stimuli 
were presented via Sennheiser headphones. For each trial, a clock face was presented, marked 
at thirty degree intervals and subtended a visual angle of five degrees.  A static dot, 
subtending at 0.2 degrees, appeared at a pseudo-randomized position and began rotating 
around the clock 250 ms later (at 2560 ms per revolution). Participants were seated at a 
viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A computer keyboard was used to record actions 
(button presses). 
Each session began with a hypnotic induction adapted from the WSGC:C (included in 
the Supplemental Material available online). Following the hypnotic induction, participants 
were given the suggestion that their finger would move involuntarily onto the key for blocks 
of trials which followed a handclap from the experimenter. Participants were then ‘counted 
out’ of hypnosis before performing the experimental task. There were three counterbalanced 
conditions. In the voluntary condition, participants pressed the key when they wished. In the 
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involuntary condition, the participant’s index finger was pulled onto the key by the 
experimenter by a fabric loop, with the experimenter’s action out of the participant’s view. A 
single handclap was made in the post-hypnotic suggestion condition approximately 20 
seconds before the start of each 35 trial block (except the solo tone condition). Participants 
were asked to rate the involuntariness of the action in each condition on a scale from 0 to 5 
after each block in each condition and, additionally, after three trials of the first block of the 
post-hypnotic condition. No handclaps were delivered in the voluntary or involuntary 
conditions. Participants were informed during the hypnotic induction that the post-hypnotic 
suggestion would be removed when they left the room at the end of the session. 
There were four trial types, presented in separate blocks. In contingent trials, pressing 
a key triggered a 1000 Hz, 100 ms duration tone after a 250 ms delay. Participants were 
asked to look at a fixation cross in the centre of the clock and to wait for at least one 
revolution before pressing the button at a time of their choosing. The trial was restarted if 
t0he action occurred before one full revolution or after six revolutions. Participants were 
asked not to plan ahead or to aim for a particular point on the clock and to report either the 
action or the tone (to give contingent action or contingent tone judgements). Baseline action 
trials were the same as contingent action trials except the button did not trigger a tone. In 
baseline tone trials, the tone was triggered pseudo-randomly between 2.5 s and 7 s following 
one revolution of the clock.  
Following the tone (or action on baseline action trials), the dot continued moving for a 
pseudo-randomised period of time between 1200 ms and 2370 ms. The clock was then 
removed from the screen for a pseudorandomised time interval (500 ms to 1280 ms). When 
the clock reappeared, participants were able to control the position of the dot using a mouse 
and were asked to position the dot at the position at which it had been at the time of the 
judged event (action or tone) and to press the mouse button to record their judgement. 
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Each block consisted of 35 repetitions of one trial type except for baseline tone trials, 
for which 13 repetitions were taken in each condition and subsequently combined into a 
single block of 39 trials. The baseline tone trials were spread across the conditions in this way 
in order to minimise the experimental duration and reduce the possibility of participants 
becoming fatigued. As the baseline tone trials required no action to take place, the different 
experimental conditions should not influence these timing judgements. Blocks were separated 
by 30 s rest periods and presented in counterbalanced order.  Before the session began, all 
participants were trained with four practice trials in the baseline tone condition and four in 
the baseline action condition. In order to reduce the effects of fatigue, the experimental task 
was split across two experimental sessions, with two conditions performed in the first session 
and one in the second. Participants were led through the hypnotic induction and count-out 
procedure at the start of each session. Sessions took place on separate days or following a gap 
of at least 2 hours. In total, the sessions took approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes, 
including training and debriefing. All Stimuli were generated with Matlab running 
Psychtoolbox v3. 
 
Analysis 
Mean judgement errors were calculated for each group on each trial type. Individual 
judgements more than 3.5 SD from the mean for each participant on each judgement type were 
then excluded before mean judgement errors were calculated for each participant, as also 
specified in Lush, Parkinson & Dienes (2016). Twenty judgements were excluded across all 
participants and trials (0.52% of judgements). Baseline action and tone judgement errors were 
subtracted from their respective contingent conditions to calculate action and outcome binding. 
Outcome binding was subtracted from action binding to produce a total binding measure.  
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Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for action, outcome and total binding 
measures. Baseline action (M) judgements and within-participant SD of baseline action 
judgements were also compared. Where there was evidence for violation of sphericity, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom were used. Significant Fs were followed up 
with Fisher’s LSD post-hoc comparisons.. 
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence for one degree of freedom 
effects. A B of above 3 indicates substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis and below 
1/3 substantial evidence for the null. Thus, all Bayes factors, B, reported here represent the 
evidence for H1 relative to H0; to find the evidence for H0 relative to H1, take 1/B. Bs between 
3 and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity (see Dienes, 2014; cf Jeffreys, 1939).  Here, BH(0, x) refers 
to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were modeled as a half-normal distribution 
with an SD of x (see Dienes, 2014); the half-normal can be used when a theory makes a 
directional prediction where x scales the size of effect that could be expected (so x can be 
chosen from e.g. relevant past studies). BN(0, x) indicates H1 was specified as a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and SD x (for non-directional predictions).  Proposals that a shared 
mechanism underlies functional motor disorders (motor disorders with no known neurological 
cause) and hypnotic involuntariness have been made since the 19th century (for a recent review 
see Bell, Oakley, Halligan & Deeley (2010). Kranick et al (2013) provide an estimate of 
intentional binding effect size for the difference between functional motor disorder patients 
and healthy volunteers; the difference between groups in outcome binding was approximately 
half the effect found in control participants. Bayes factors for differences in each measure were 
therefore calculated using a half-normal distribution with SD based on half the mean in the 
voluntary condition. BU[0,max] refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were 
modeled as a Uniform distribution from 0 to max. We used this model for the rating of 
involuntariness which is on a scale from 0 to 5; thus the maximum that the population mean 
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difference between conditions could be was 5. A Bayes factor for the regression of the 
difference in outcome binding between voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions on reported 
involuntariness in the post-hypnotic suggestion condition was calculated using a half-normal 
distribution with SD based on the quotient of the mean outcome binding in the medium group 
(as an independent estimate of the rough amount of binding that could exist in highs) and the 
range of the involuntariness rating scale (i.e. 120/6).  Bayes factors for simple interactions 
between two conditions and group were calculated modeling H1 using half the mean binding 
in both groups for the relevant binding component. 
 
Predictions 
We tested highly hypnotisable and medium hypnotisable groups on an intentional 
binding task in voluntary action and in two involuntary conditions, in which the action was 
passive or was reported to be experienced as involuntary following a post-hypnotic 
suggestion (in which response occurs following hypnosis, Barnier & McConkey, 1998) of 
action involuntariness. As binding is sensitive to agency, binding should be strongest in the 
voluntary condition and weaker in passive action. If the experience of involuntariness 
reported in hypnotic responding by highly hypnotisable subjects reflects real changes in the 
experience of agency, intentional binding should also be weakened in post-hypnotically 
suggested involuntariness in highly hypnotisable subjects.  In terms of the comparison of 
highly with medium hypnotisable subjects, highs compared to mediums should have a greater 
difference in binding between voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions, and between passive 
and post-hypnotic conditions; no prediction is made for highs being different from mediums 
in the difference between voluntary and passive conditions. 
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Results 
Involuntariness ratings. Table 1 shows mean involuntariness ratings for each group 
in each condition. The effects of hypnotisability on reported involuntariness were analysed 
using hypnotisability (high vs medium) as a between-subjects factor and condition (voluntary 
action vs post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness vs passive action) as a within-subject 
factor. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between condition and group on reported 
involuntariness, F (1, 22) = 50.85, p < .001, η2p = .698. The interaction was decomposed into 
the simple effect of condition for each hypnotisability group.  For the highly hypnotisable group, 
there was a significant effect of agency condition on involuntariness, F(2, 18) = 135.2, p <.001, 
η2p = .94. Compared to voluntary action, participants reported more involuntariness in the 
passive action, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 3.84 x 10
28, 95% CI [-4.98, -3.62], dz = 5.53, and post-hypnotic 
conditions, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 3.53 x 10
11, 95% CI [-3.62, -2.23], dz = 3.01. However, passive 
actions were reported to be more involuntary than actions performed following a post-hypnotic 
suggestion of involuntariness, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 2.15 x 10
8, 95% CI  [.99, 1.76], dz = 2.53.  For 
the medium hypnotisable group, there was a significant effect of agency condition on 
involuntariness, F(2, 26) = 413.08, p <.001, η2p = .97. Compared to passive action, participants 
reported less involuntariness in the voluntary action condition, p <.001, BU[0,5] = 6.95 x 10
125,  
95% CI [-5.00-, -4.28], dz = 7.33. There was evidence for no difference between voluntariness 
ratings in the voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions, p  >.250, BU[0,5] = .10, 95% CI [-.53, .24], 
dz = .22. Passive actions were rated as more involuntary than actions performed following a 
post-hypnotic suggestion of involuntariness, p <.001, BU[0,5] =  2.43 x 10
84, 95% CI  [4.06, 4.94], 
dz = 5.92. 
Total binding. Analyses of the total binding measure are reported in the online 
supplemental material 
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Outcome binding. Table 2 shows the binding measures in each condition for both 
groups and Table 3 shows p values, Bayes factors, 95% confidence intervals and effect size for 
post-hoc comparisons for each main effect. The effects of hypnotisability on outcome binding 
were analysed using hypnotisability (high or medium) as a between-subjects factor and 
condition (voluntary action, post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness or passive action) as 
a within-subject factor. There was a significant main effect of condition on outcome binding, 
Fcorrected(1.42, 31.30) = 10.30, p = .001, η2p = .319, but no significant main effect of 
hypnotisability on this measure, F(1, 22) = .929, p  > .250, η2p = .041.  There was a marginally 
significant interaction between condition and group on outcome binding, Fcorrected(1.42, 31.30) 
= 2.81, p = .091, η2p = .11. The theory that hypnotic response is experienced as passive predicts 
two key partial interactions. Specifically, there was, as predicted, an interaction between group 
and voluntary vs post-hypnotic conditions on outcome binding, F(1,22) = 9.18, p = .006, BH(0, 
62.5) =  39.01, η2p = .29. There was no evidence one way or the other for a predicted interaction 
between passive and post-hypnotic conditions, F(1,22) = .222, p  >.250, BH(0, 62.5) = .67, η2p 
= .01. Finally there was no sensitive evidence for an interaction between group and voluntary 
vs passive conditions on outcome binding, F(1,22) = 3.52, p = .074, BN(0, 62.5) = 1.63, η2p = .14. 
The planned simple effect of condition for the highly hypnotisability group revealed a 
significant effect of agency on outcome binding, Fcorrected(1.15, 10.37) = 5.50, p = .037, η2p 
= .38. Compared to voluntary action, outcome binding was lower for both the passive action 
and post-hypnotic conditions. For the medium hypnotisable group, there was also a significant 
effect of agency on outcome binding, F(2, 24) = 5.52, p = .010, η2p = .30. Compared to passive 
action, outcome binding was higher for voluntary and post-hypnotic action. There was sensitive 
evidence for no difference in outcome binding between the voluntary and post-hypnotic 
conditions. 
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Action binding. The effects of hypnotisability on action binding were analysed using 
hypnotisability (high or medium) as a between-subjects factor and condition (voluntary action, 
post-hypnotically suggested involuntariness or passive action) as a within-subject factor. There 
was no significant main effect of condition on action binding, F(2, 44) = .579, p > .250, η2p 
= .026, nor was there a significant effect of group, F(1, 22) = 1.165, p > .250, η2p = .050. The 
interaction between condition and group on action binding was also not significant, F (2, 44) 
= .579, p > .250, η2p = .03. The more precise partial interactions were all non-evidential; no 
conclusions follow. Specifically,  there was only insensitive evidence for the interaction 
between group and voluntary vs post-hypnotic conditions on action binding,  F(1,22) = .859, 
p > .250, BH(0, 19) = 1.19, η2p = .038;   the same for the interaction between group and voluntary 
and passive conditions on action binding, F(1,22) = .013, p >.250, , BN(0, 19) = .68, η2p = .001; 
and for the interaction between group and passive vs post-hypnotic conditions, F(1,22) = .623, 
p >.250, BH(0, 19) = 1.22, η2p = .03. The planned simple effect of condition for the highly 
hypnotisability group was not significant, F(1.30, 11.72) = .032, p > .250, η2p = .004. While 
the action binding shifts in the voluntary condition for highly hypnotisable participants are 
comparable to other reported results (e.g., 20 ms reported in Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 
2002), we found no sensitive evidence for a difference in action binding between conditions to 
parallel the shift in outcome binding. However, as can be seen in Table 2, neither is there is 
substantial evidence for no difference between any two conditions; the data are simply 
insensitive and provide support for neither the experimental or null hypothesis. We can 
therefore draw no conclusions about action binding based on the results of this study. The 
insensitivity is not surprising; as we found, outcome binding is typically a bigger effect than 
action binding (e.g. Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011; Kranick et al, 2013; Lush, Parkinson 
& Dienes, 2016). Given that action binding is characterised by a smaller shift than tone binding, 
a larger sample might be required to reveal differences in this measure. 
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Figure 1 shows the derived interval between the action and tone events in each 
condition. As outcome binding was reduced but not eliminated in passive actions, these results 
are broadly consistent with evidence that intentional binding is a special case of a general causal 
binding (Buehner, 2012). As passive actions were reported to be more involuntary than post-
hypnotically induced involuntariness for highly hypnotisable subjects, we should expect a 
difference in magnitude of binding between these two conditions. Table 2 shows that the mean 
values follow this expected pattern. However, as the comparisons between these two conditions 
are insensitive, we can draw no firm conclusions about this pattern of results (table 3).  
To investigate the relationship between the experience of involuntariness and binding, 
regression analysis of the difference in outcome binding between voluntary and post-hypnotic 
suggestion conditions over reported involuntariness in the post-hypnotic condition was 
conducted. All medium and highly hypnotisable participants (including those excluded from 
other analyses because they were unable to maintain involuntariness) were included in this 
analysis.  
 
Reported involuntariness predicted the difference in outcome binding between 
voluntary and post-hypnotic conditions, the raw slope being 19 ms/rating unit, t(27) = 
2.37, p = .025, BH(0, 20) = 6.48. Therefore, outcome binding was reduced in the post-hypnotic 
condition compared to the voluntary condition as reported involuntariness increased, 
supporting the hypothesis that binding difference is related to subjective experience.  
 
Figure 1: Derived time intervals between action and tone events in the highly hypnotisable 
group: ** = 3 <B <10, *** = B >10 
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Table 1: Mean (SE) involuntariness ratings in each group. 0 = completely voluntary, 5 = 
completely involuntary. 
   Condition  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary Post-hypnotic 
involuntariness 
Passive 
High     
 Involuntariness rating .7 (.30) 3.3 (.17) 5 (0) 
Medium     
 Involuntariness rating .3 (.16) .4 (.20) 4.9 (.07) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Mean binding for the high and medium hypnotisable groups in the three 
experimental conditions  
   Condition  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary Post-hypnotic 
involuntariness 
Passive 
High     
 Action binding 28.0 (25.0) 24.6 (56.7) 23.2 (53.7) 
 Outcome binding -130.7 (45.4) -69.4 (56.0) -50.51 (89.1) 
Medium     
 Action binding 9.9 (28.2) 25.6 (38.4) 3.1 (42.9) 
 Outcome binding -120.2 (66.3) -117.9 (67.9) -83.5 (79.7) 
Mean times are given in ms (SD). 
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Table 3: Post-hoc comparisons between each condition in the high and medium hypnotisable 
groups. 
   Comparison  
Group 
(hypnotisability) 
 Voluntary action vs 
passive action 
Voluntary action vs Post-
hypnotic suggestion 
Passive action vs post-
hypnotic suggestion 
High     
 Action 
binding 
  p > .250                 
BH(0, 14) = .91                
95% CI [-29.3, 38.8]              
dz = 0.10 
p > .250                    
BH(0, 14) = .89              
95% CI [-32.9, 39.7]             
dz = 0.07 
p > .250               
BH(0, 14) = .93             
95% CI [-59.4, 56.8]           
dz = 0.02 
 Outcome 
binding 
  p = .003*               
BH(0, 65) = 79.51**    
95% CI [-124.4, -35.9]          
dz =1.08 
  p = .009*               
BH(0, 65) = 14.70**     
95% CI [-103.4, -19.2]          
dz = 0.93 
p > .250                  
BH 0, 65) = .76            
95% CI [-59.0, 96.8]           
dz = 0.17 
Medium     
 Action 
binding 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 5) = 1.08           
95% CI [-16.8, 30.5]                         
dz = .17 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 5) = .77             
95% CI [-44.3, 12.8]                        
dz = .31 
   p = .121              
BH(0, 5) = 1.33      
95% CI [-52.0, -6.9]                        
dz = .43 
 Outcome 
binding 
p = .019*                 
BH(0, 60) = 7.07**         
95% CI [-66.4, -7.0]              
dz = .67 
p > .250                   
BH(0, 60) = .22**          
95% CI [-23.5, 18.8]                      
dz = .063 
   p = .022*               
BH 0, 60) = 6.11**      
95% CI [-62.8, -5.9]                      
dz = .65 
* Significant at the .05 level. ** Sensitive B (> 3 or < 1/3). 
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Discussion 
Replicating previous studies, causal binding in voluntary action was stronger than in 
passive action (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002; Buehner, 2015). Crucially, binding was 
also reduced in high hypnotisables after a post-hypnotic suggestion of involuntariness, 
providing evidence for hypnotically induced changes in sense of agency.  
We only found evidence for changes in outcome binding. The prediction of the 
sensory outcome of an action may provide cues for sense of agency by comparing a predicted 
sensory outcome to the actual outcome and hypnotic suggestion may disrupt this mechanism 
by preventing motor intentions from activating sensorimotor predictions (Blakemore, Oakley 
& Frith, 2003). Therefore, reduced outcome binding may arise from disruption to a 
comparator preventing sensorimotor pre-representation of an action outcome.  
An alternative account proposes that, by analogy with cross-modal cue combination 
(Ernst & Banks, 2002; Körding  et al, 2007), the timing judgements of intentional actions and 
their outcomes may be a weighted average of the action and outcome cues (Kawabe, 
Roseboom & Nishida, 2013), with the weighting dependent on the estimated precision with 
which each is individually timed. The decreased outcome judgement shift reported here may 
therefore arise from the increased weighting of the outcome cue over the action cue in 
estimating the time of the outcome event when motor intention information is discounted and 
the estimated precision of the action cue consequently decreases (consistently, in the 
supplemental material we report lower within-participant SD in the voluntary than in the 
post-hypnotic condition for high hypnotisables and sensitive evidence of no difference in 
medium hypnotisables). This would occur in passive action because motor intention 
information is absent, and in post-hypnotic involuntariness because hypnotist induced beliefs 
reduce the relative weighting of motor intentions in generating sense of agency. A cue 
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combination mechanism is predictive of an increase in action binding when motor intention 
information is reduced, as lower precision of action should result in a relatively higher 
weighting of the outcome cue in outcome timing judgements and consequently a greater shift 
of the weighted average of the two events toward the action cue. This might run contrary to 
our prediction of reduction in overall binding, as the two opposing shifts would, to at least 
some degree, cancel each other out. However, as we report no sensitive evidence for 
differences in action binding, the results of the current study do not bear on this prediction 
either way.   
While the current study is the first to show the relevance of beliefs about intentions to 
binding, outcome binding is also reduced when participants incorrectly believe that an 
outcome is triggered by another’s action (Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011). This may 
reflect a reduced contribution of motor intentions to outcome timing judgements when, 
according to beliefs, such information is not relevant to event timing. Binding has also been 
shown to be reduced when participants are instructed to press a particular key at a particular 
time (Caspar et al 2016). By contrast, in the current study, participants were free to press the 
button when they wished and were merely instructed that they would not feel that they had 
intended the action.  
It might be argued that hypnotic responding occurs in the absence of intentions (e.g. 
Woody & Bowers, 1994). However, given hypnotic actions are performed in appropriate and 
flexible ways, intentions appear undisrupted in hypnotic responding, and it is the 
metacognition of intentions that is disrupted (e.g. see Woody &Sadler, 2008). Thus, the 
difference between hypnotic and non-hypnotic action may lie in the awareness of intentions 
(Dienes, 2012; Lush, Naish & Dienes, 2016). If so, an intention being conscious may increase 
its availability to other processes (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), and thus to the process of 
timing its associated action. Consistently, mindfulness meditators, who may have more 
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accurate metacognition of motor intentions (Dreyfus, 2011), show stronger outcome binding 
(Lush, Parkinson & Dienes, 2016). It should be noted that highly hypnotisable people are a 
highly selected group, and these results may not generalise to the general population. 
We report that hypnotically suggested actions behave more like genuinely involuntary 
than voluntary actions in an implicit measure sensitive to agency, providing objective 
evidence for hypnotically suggested changes in agentic experience and demonstrating that 
beliefs about whether an action is intended influence binding. 
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